We focus on the problem of learning equilibria in a particular routing game similar to the Wardrop traffic model. We describe a routing game played by a large number of players and present a distributed learning algorithm that we prove to (weakly) converge to equilibria for the system. The proof of convergence is based on a differential equation governing the global evolution of the system that is inferred from all the local evolutions of the agents in play. We prove that the differential equation converges with the help of Lyapunov techniques.
Introduction
We consider here a problem that could very well arise in different kinds of networks, phone, computer, etc... Where the issue of optimizing the flows (of information or physical) in the network can become crucial. In the early fifties, Wardrop introduced, in a study on road transportation networks (see [32] ), a model for helping to apprehend road traffic variations, observing patterns and other things. The goal of his study was to understand how to improve the road network in general, in terms of traveling time for drivers, queuing time at critical points, road congestion, danger for pedestrians and so forth. An alternative presentation of the model can be found in [29] . This model, that has proved to be solid, has been conceived to represent various road transportation problems with infinitely many users, each one of them being responsible for an infinitesimal amount of traffic. A user was seen as belonging to, or assigned to, what is called a commodity and for each of several commodities, a certain amount of traffic, or flow demand, has to be routed from a given source to a given destination via a collection of paths. A flow in which, for all commodities, the latencies of all used paths are minimal, with respect to the commodity they are linked to, is called a Wardrop equilibrium of the network. Whereas it is well-known that such equilibria can be solved by centralized algorithms in polynomial time, as in [30] , we are interested in distributed algorithms to compute Wardrop equilibria. Actually, our model is slightly different from the original Wardrop model [32] (and similar to the one considered in [30] ) in the sense that we consider the flow to be incurred by a finite number N of users. Also, while each one of the players remains responsible for a fraction of the entire flow of their respective commodity, we will not be approaching the eventual convergence of the system from a commodity angle. Any player has a set of admissible paths among which he aims at balancing his own strategy, which consists in a choice policy over his set of paths, such that, after some time, he finds a strategy that would assure him the highest utility. In some cases, the jointly computed allocation will be both a Nash equilibrium and a Wardrop equilibrium for the system.
Our motivation is to understand if, how and when equilibria can be learned in games. The dynamic considered here has both the advantage of being decentralized and of requiring partial and very limited informations. We have indeed a discrete stochastic dynamic with N players playing a repeated game, at each time step they all choose between a finite number of strategies (paths) they can use. After each play, players get to know the result of the path they chose, or its latency. Players want to learn the optimal strategy which will be the one that keeps their latency as low as possible. After each play, each player updates his strategy based solely on his current action and the latency he experienced. We want to design a distributed algorithm that learns equilibria in games while requiring minimal informations for players to use.
In [26] , Thathachar et al. presented a dynamic for learning Nash equilibria in multiperson games. This dynamic is such that, for general games and under certain strong conditions, all stable stationary points are Nash equilibria. Whereas the dynamic is not necessarily convergent for general games (see [26] ), we show here that it is convergent for linear Wardrop networks. We call linear Wardrop networks the case where latency functions are affine.
Our approach is based on what can be seen as a macroscopic abstraction of the microscopic evolution rules of the involved agents, in terms of differential equations governing the global state of the system. We prove that this dynamic converges to some stable state for linear Wardrop networks with the help of Lyapunov techniques. We give a short hint of non converging settings in the last part of the paper.
Related Work
In the history of game theory, various algorithms for learning equilibrium states have been proposed: centralized and decentralized (or distributed) algorithms, games with perfect, complete or incomplete information, with a restricted number of players, etc... See e.g. [20] for an introduction to the learning automata model, and the general references in [26] for specific studies for zero-sum games, N -person games with common payoff, non-cooperative games, etc...
Wardrop traffic model was introduced in [32] to apprehend road traffic. More recently, it has often been considered as a model of computer network traffic. The price of anarchy, introduced by [19] in order to compare costs of Nash equilibria to costs of optimal (social) states has been intensively studied on these games: see e.g. [29, 28, 4, 13, 5] .
There are a few works considering dynamical versions of these games, where agents try to learn equilibria, in the spirit of this paper.
In [10] , extending [11] and [12] , Fischer and al. consider a game in the original Wardrop settings, i.e. a case where each user carries an infinitesimal amount of traffic. At each round, each agent samples an alternative routing path and compares the latency on its current path with the sampled one. If an agent observes that it can improve its latency, then it switches with some probability that depends on the improvement offered by the better paths, otherwise, it sticks to its current path. Upper bounds on the time of convergence were established for asymmetric and symmetric games. A symmetric game is made of one single commodity, asymmetric games are with more than one commodity.
In [30] Fischer and al. consider a more tractable version of this learning algorithm, considering a model with a finite number of players, similar to ours. The considered algorithm, based on a randomized path decomposition in every communication round, is also very different from ours.
Nash equilibria learning algorithms for other problems have also been considered recently, in particular for load balancing problems.
Note that the proof of existence of a pure Nash equilibria for the load balancing problem of [19] can be turned into a dynamics: players play in turn, and move to machines with a lower load. Such a strategy can be proved to lead to a pure Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the convergence time have been investigated in [7, 8] . Since players play in turns, this is often called the Elementary Step System. Other results of convergence in this model have been investigated in [14, 22, 25] .
Concerning models that allow concurrent redecisions, we can mention the followings works. In [9] , tasks are allowed in parallel to migrate from overloaded to underloaded resources. The process is proved to terminate in expected O(log log n+log m) rounds.
In [3] is considered a distributed process that avoids that latter problem: only local knowledge is required. The process is proved to terminate in expected O(log log n+m 4 ) rounds. The analysis is done only for unitary weights and identical machines. Techniques involved in the proof, relying on martingale techniques, are somehow related to techniques for studying the classical problem of allocating balls into bins games as evenly as possible. The dynamics considered in our present paper has been studied in [26] for general stochastic games where Thathachar & al. proved that the dynamics is weakly convergent to some function, solution of an ordinary differential equation. This ordinary differential equation turns out to be a replicator equation. While a sufficient condition for convergence is given, no error bounds are provided and no potential function is established.
Replicator equations have been deeply studied in evolutionary game theory [17, 33] . Evolutionary game theory isn't restricted to these dynamics but considers a whole family of dynamics that satisfy a so called folk theorem in the spirit of Theorem 2.
Bounds on the rate of convergence of fictitious play dynamics have been established in [15] , and in [18] for the best response dynamics. Fictitious play has been proved to be convergent for zero-sum games using numerical analysis methods or, more generally, stochastic approximation theory: fictitious play can be proved to be a Euler discretization of a certain continuous time process [17] .
A replicator equation for allocation games has been considered in [1] , where authors establish a potential function for it. Their dynamics is not the same as ours: we have a replicator dynamics where fitnesses are given by true costs, whereas for some reason, marginal costs are considered in [1] .
Wardrop's Traffic Model
We consider a routing game as given by a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E) with V the set of nodes and E the set of edges (directed connexion between 2 nodes). To each edge e ∈ E is associated a continuous and non decreasing latency function e : R + → R + . We are given [C] = {1, 2, ..., C} a set of commodities, each of which is specified by a triplet consisting, for commodity c, in: a source-destination pair of nodes denoted by (s c , t c ), a subgraph G c = (V c , E c ) of G connecting s c and t c with all possible paths between these 2 nodes, and a flow demand R c ≥ 0. The total flow demand in the network is R = c∈[C] R c . We may assume without loss of generality that R = 1. Let P c denote the admissible paths of commodity c, i.e. all paths connecting s c and t c . We may assume that the sets P c , for all c ∈ [C] are disjoint and define c P to be the unique commodity to which path P belongs.
A non-negative path flow vector (f P ) P ∈P is feasible if it satisfies the flow demands P ∈Pc f P = R c , for all c ∈ [C]. A path flow vector (f P ) P ∈P induces an edge flow vector f = (f e,c ) e∈E,c∈ [C] with f e,c = P ∈Pc:e∈P f P . The total flow on edge e is f e = c∈[C] f e,c . The latency of an edge e is given by e (f e ) and the latency of a path P is given by the sum of the latencies of its edges.
(
A flow vector in this model is considered stable when no fraction of the flow (which is a player's flow in our case) can improve his latency by moving unilaterally to another path. It is easy to see that this implies that all used paths in the same commodity must have the same (minimal) latency.
Definition 3.1. A feasible flow vector f is at a Wardrop Equilibrium if for every commodity c ∈ [C] and paths
We now extend the original Wardrop model [32] to an N player game (similar settings have been considered in [30] ). We assume that we have a finite set [N ] of players, each of which is associated to one commodity. Players represent a small fraction of the total flow of their fixed commodity and they want to find the strategy with the lowest latency in the sense of Nash which is formally defined in Definition 3.2.
In this present work, we narrowed down our investigations to the case of linear cost functions. We assume here that for every edge e, there are some constants α e , and β e > 0 such that the associated latency function is of the form e (f e ) = α e f e + β e . As we said previously, we study the evolution of the system from a player perspective. In order to ease the notation we denote com(i) the commodity player i plays in.
Game Theoretic Settings
Players are selfish and they play without any centralized control, they also have a very local -restricted -view of the system. Every player i ∈ [N ] has the finite set of actions, or paths, P com(i) . For every player i, choosing an element of P com(i) can be considered as playing a pure strategy. For player i we note m i = |P com(i) | the number of paths available to him.
As already said, we suppose that the game is played repeatedly. At each elementary time step t, players know their latency and the path they choose. Each one of them selects a path at each game according to his mixed strategy that we note q i (t) for player i. ∀i ∈ [N ], ∀s ∈ [1, m i ], q i,s denotes the probability for player i to select path s at step t.
More precisely, at the end of each game, players are rewarded with random payoffs which are function of all the latencies of all the paths they chose for the game and what it cost them (here, the latency they experience). This notion of payoff is often referred to as utility or also fitness in evolutionary game theory. This indicates how satisfied -happy -players are about the game they just played and what the result is for them. Here we note r i (t) the utility for player i at game t with
where P i (t) is the path player i chose at time t.
Remark 3.1. We assume here that latencies are always greater than (or equal to) 0 and always smaller than (or equal to) 1. We do so without loss of generality in what follows, in order to simplify the reasoning. If latencies don't fit these requirements and under certain conditions on the latency functions, they can be normalized by players while attributing the utility value to the latency they get. A normalized utility for player i would be of the form r i = 1 −
with X big enough.
The result of a game for any player i depends on all the choices made by the other players. We define the payoff function d i :
where (a 1 , ..., a N ) is the set of pure strategies played by all the players.
Recall that we defined P to be the latency of path P and that ∀i, a i (t) corresponds to one specific path in P com(i) at each time t. From now on, we will write ai(t) (f ) as the latency of the path implied by a i (t).
where f is the flow induced by a 1 , a 2 , ..., a N . Now, we want to extend the payoff function -or the utility function -to mixed strategies. To do so, let S mi denote the simplex of dimension m i which is the set of m i -dimensional probability vectors:
For a player associated to commodity i, we write abusively S for S mi , i.e. the set of its mixed strategies.
We denote by K = S N the space of mixed strategies. The payoff function d i defined on pure strategies in equation (3) can be extended to function g i on the space of mixed strategies K. Note that we consider this function as an expectation on the utility. This is because we assume that flows of information can not be split in our model.
We define the mean expected payoff function g i :
where (q 1 , ..., q N ) is the set of mixed strategies played by the set of players and E denotes a conditional expectation. Now that we have defined the mean utility value, we can formally define Nash equilibria.
December The N -tuple of mixed strategies (q 1 , ...,q N ) is said to be a Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies), if for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have:
It is well known that every n-person game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies [24] .
We define K * = (S * ) N where S * = {∀i, q i ∈ S mi | q i is a m i -dimensional probability vector with 1 component unity} as the corners of the strategy space K. Clearly, K * can be put in one-to-one correspondence with pure strategies. A Ntuple of actions (ã 1 , ...,ã N ) can be defined to be a pure Nash Equilibrium similarly. Now the learning problem can be stated as follows: Assume that we play a stochastic repeated game with incomplete information. q i [t] is the strategy employed by the i th player at instant t. Let a i [t] and c i [t] be the action selected and the payoff obtained by player i respectively at time t (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ). Find a decentralized learning algorithm T i , where where (q 1 , . ..,q N ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Distributed Algorithm
We consider the following learning algorithm, already considered in [20, 26] . The way of doing the update is also called the Linear Reward-Inaction (L R−I ) algorithm.
Definition 4.1 (Considered Algorithm)
(1) At every time step, each player chooses an action according to its current Action Probability Vector (APV). Thus, the i th player selects path s = a i (t) at instant t with probability q i,s (t). (2) Each player gets to know his utility, based on the set of all actions, for the game. r i (t) ∈ [0, 1] = 1 − ai(t) (f (t)). (3) Each player updates his AP V according to the rule:
where 0 < b < 1 is a precision parameter and e ai(k) is a unit vector of dimension m i with a i (t) th component unity.
It is easy to see that decisions made by players are completely decentralized, at each time step player i only needs r i and a i , respectively his utility and last action, to update his APV.
Notice that, componentwise, Equation (7) can be interpreted as the following 2 case scenario:
Evolution over time
Let Q[t] = (q 1 (t), ..., q N (t)) ∈ K denote the state of all the players at instant t. Our interest is in the asymptotic behavior of Q[t] and its convergence to a Nash Equilibrium. Clearly, under the learning algorithm specified by (7), {Q[t], t ≥ 0} is a Markov process.
Observe that this dynamic can also be put in the form
where a[t] = (a 1 (t), ..., a N (t)) denotes the actions selected by all the players at time t and r[t] = (r 1 (t), ..., r N (t)) their resulting utilities, for some function G(., ., .) representing the updating, specified by equation (7), that does not depend on b.
Consider the piecewise-constant interpolation of
where b is the parameter used in (7). Q b (.) belongs to the space of all functions from R into K. These functions are right continuous and have left hand limits. Now consider the sequence {Q b (.) : b > 0}. We are interested in the limit Q(.) of this sequence as b → 0.
Approximating the trajectory
The following is proved in [26] : 
where G is the function in Equation (9) .
Recall that a family of random variable (Y t ) t∈R weakly converges to a random variable Y , if E[h(X t )] converges to E[h(Y )] for each bounded and continuous function h. This is equivalent to convergence in distributions.
The proof of Proposition 4.1 in [26] , that works for general (even with stochastic payoffs) games, is based on constructions from [21] , in turn based on [31] , i.e. on weak-convergence methods, non-constructive in several aspects, and does not provide error bounds.
It is actually possible to provide a bound on the error between Q(t) and the expectation of Q b (.) in some cases. We will say a few words about that before getting back to the evolution of the system over time in section 5. (9), and let Q b (.) be the corresponding piecewise-constant interpolation, given by (10) . Assume that
for some function φ of class C 1 . Let (k) be the error in approximating the expectation of Q b (k) by Q(t):
where Q(.) is the (unique) solution of the Cauchy problem
where
for k of the form k = tb, t ∈ N, where Λ = max i, || ∂φ ∂q i, ||, and M is a bound on the
Proof. The general idea of the proof is to consider the dynamic (9), as an Euler discretization method of the ordinary differential equation (12), and then use some classical numerical analysis techniques to bound the error at time t. Indeed, by hypothesis we have
a[t], c[t])] = E[Q[t]] + bφ(E[Q[t]]).
Suppose that φ(.) is Λ-Lipschitz, then we know that for some positive Λ,
From Taylor-Lagrange inequality, we can suppose Λ = max i, ||
We can write,
where e(tb) = ||bφ(Q(tb)) − From an easy recurrence on t, (sometimes called Discrete Gronwall's Lemma, see e.g. [6] ), using inequality ((t + 1)b) ≤ (1 + Λb) (tb) + H, we get that
using that (1 + u) t ≤ e tu for all u ≥ 0, and (0) = 0.
Expected utilities and variation of the system over time
We defined in section 3 the utility functions d i (a[t]) and g i (Q[t]) respectively on pure and mixed strategies. In our settings, players use one unique path at each game, for considering that, we define a function that expresses the expected utility on a certain path for a player at a given game. Let h i,s (Q) be the expected utility for player i if he decides to play the pure strategy (path) s, and players j = i play (mixed) strategy q j . Formally,
where Q −i stands the set of actions of all players but player i. Let h i (Q) be the mean value of h i,s (Q) according to q i , in the sense that
Evolution of players over time
By Theorem 1, the limit Q of the interpolated process Q b given by (10) satisfies the ODE (11). Recall that Q consists of N probability vectors. Solutions of the ODE live in the set K defined previously. As discussed in section 3, the points in K * represent pure strategies and are referred to as corners of K. If we note m i the number of paths available to player i, we have that Q contains m 1 + m 2 + ... + m N components which are denoted by q i,s , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ s ≤ m i . φ also has the same number of components which we denote as φ i,s .
Using (8), we can rewrite φ i,s in the general case as follows.
using the fact that s =s q i,s = 1 − q i,s .
We obtain
Hence, the dynamics given by the ODE (11) can be rewritten, componentwise as:
Note that this is a replicator equation, a well-known and studied dynamic in evolutionary game theory [17, 33] .
Convergence in linear Wardrop games
The following so-called folk theorem characterizes the solutions of the ODE and hence characterizes the long term behavior of the learning algorithm [17, 26] .
Theorem 2. The following are true for the solutions of the replicator equation (15):
• All corners of space K are stationary points.
• All Nash equilibria are stationary points.
• All strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable.
• All stable stationary points are Nash equilibria.
From this theorem, we can conclude that, if we put aside the case of trivial (constant) dynamics, the dynamic (15) , and hence the learning algorithm when b goes to 0, will never converge to a point in K which is not a Nash equilibrium.
However, for general games, there is no convergence in the general case [26] . We will now show that for linear Wardrop games, there is always convergence. It will then follow that the learning algorithm we are considering here converges towards Nash equilibria, i.e. solves the learning problem for linear Wardrop games.
First, we specialize the dynamic for our routing games, regarding latency functions, we have
where 1 e∈aj is 1 whenever e ∈ a j , 0 otherwise. e ∈ a i means edge e belongs to the sequence of edges -or path -induced by a i . Let us also introduce the following notation:
which denotes the probability for player i of using edge e according to his probability vector q i . Using this, we can write the expected utility for player i when using path s as:
Now let us provide a sufficient condition on Q(t) for the game to converge to some point in K with the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Extension of Theorem 3.3 from [26] ) Suppose there is a nonnegative function
Then the learning algorithm, for any initial condition in K − K * , always converges to a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the variation of F along the trajectories of the ODE. We have
Thus F is non decreasing along the trajectories of the ODE and, due to the nature of the learning algorithm, all solutions of the ODE (15), for initial conditions in K will be confined to K.
Hence from the Lyapunov Stability theorem (see e.g. [16] , page 194), if we note Q * an equilibrium point, we can define L(Q) = F (Q) − F (Q * ) as a Lyapunov function of the game. Asymptotically, all trajectories will be in the set K = {Q * ∈ K :
* is consequently a stationary point of the dynamics. Since from Theorem 2, all stationary points that are not Nash equilibria are unstable, the theorem follows.
Given its nature, this kind of function is often referred to as a potential function in game theory [2, 27, 23] . In what follows, we call that function F a potential function for our game.
A potential function
We now provide a potential function for our game that satisfies Equation (18).
Proposition 5.1. For the definition we gave in this paper of linear Wardrop games, the following function F satisfies the hypothesis of the previous theorem:
Notice that the hypothesis of affine cost functions is crucial here.
Proof. We first rewrite the potential function F as F (Q) = e∈E A e (Q) in order to lighten the next few lines.
∂qi,s , which can be rewritten as From (17), we get that
∂qi,s = 1 e∈s , we can rewrite
Let us now develop the derivative of each term of the sum and come back to (21) in the end, we have
which corresponds to the expected price on edge e for player i when he knows he is going to use this edge (it belongs to the path he chooses). 
We showed that Equation (18) holds here. The constants x i of the theorem are simply, in this case, the weights w i of the players. This completes the proof and confirms that F is a convenient function for the game.
We now provide a short example on why latency functions need to be linear with these settings.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose for example that cost functions were quadratic : e (λ e ) = α e λ 2 e + β e λ e + γ e , with α e , β e , γ e ≥ 0, α e = 0.
There can not exist a function F of class C 2 that satisfies (18) for all i, s, Q, and general choice of weights w i . Coming back to our model (with affine costs), we obtain the following result:
Theorem 4. For linear Wardrop games, for any initial condition in K − K * , the considered learning algorithm converges to a (mixed) Nash equilibrium.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered a game based on the classical Wardrop traffic model, with finitely any players and we introduced some specific dynamical aspects.
We considered an update algorithm proposed by [26] and we proved that the learning algorithm depicted is able to learn mixed Nash equilibria of the game, extending several results of [26] .
To do so, we proved that the learning algorithm is asymptotically equivalent to an ordinary differential equation, which turns out to be a replicator equation. Using a folk theorem from evolutionary game theory, one knows that if the dynamics converges, it will be towards some Nash equilibria. We proved using a Lyapunov function argument that the dynamic converges in our considered settings.
We established some bounds on the error in approximating the discrete process by a continuous function, based on the analysis of the dynamics and numerical analysis arguments in some special cases. Our next intent is to be more specific about the convergence time and to lower it.
We believe that this paper exhibits a very nice example of distributed systems whose study is done through a continuous view of a discrete system. With the analysis of the distributed learning algorithm players use and considering how they
